‘There
can be no presumption that the wealthy and the mighty will submit
themselves to trial and that the humble and the poor will run away from
the course of justice, any more than there can be a presumptions that
the former are more likely to commit a crime and the later are more
likely to commit it. In his charge to the jury salishbury assizes, 1899,
(to which Krishna Iyer. J. he referred in Gudikanti A. I .R.1978Sc 129)
Lord Russell of Killowen said …………it was the duty of magistrate to
admit accused person to bail, when ever practicable, unless thewe strong
grounds for supposing that such person would not appear to take their
trial .It was not the poorer class who did not appear, for, their
circumstances were such as to tie them to the place where they carried
their work .They had not the golden wings with which they fly from
justice1.
The
word “Anticipatory Bail” is not found in s. 438 or in its marginal
note. In fact “anticipatory bail” is a misnomer as it is not bail
presently granted in anticipation of arrest .When the Court grants
anticipatory bail , what it does is to make an order that in the event
of arrest ,a person shall be released on bail. Manifestly there is no
question of release on bail unless a person is arrested, and therefore,
it is only on arrest that the order granting “Anticipatory Bail” becomes
operative. The Section, however, makes no distinction whether the
arrest is apprehended at the hands of the police or at the instance of
the magistrate. The issuance of warrant by the magistrate against a
person justifiably gives right to such an apprehension and well entitled
a person to make a prayer for anticipatory bail. Issuance of summons
for appearance also entitled an accused to apply for anticipatory bail2.
It
has also been held that anticipatory bail cannot be granted to a person
to do some thing which is likely to be interpreted as commission of
crime even if the offender intended it as something in exercise of his
rights3.
The expression ‘anticipatory bail’ is a convenient mode of conveying
that it is possible to apply for bail in anticipation of arrest4.
The distinction between an ordering order of bail and an order of
anticipatory bail is that where as the former is granted after arrest
and, therefore, means release from the custody of the police, the later
is granted in anticipation of arrest and is, therefore, effective at the
very moment of arrest5.
Sec
438 makes a provision enabling the Superior Court to grant anticipatory
bail e.g. A direction to release a person on bail even before a person
is arrested.
The Law Commission considered the need for such a provision and observed:
“The
necessity for granting anticipatory bails arises mainly because some
times influential persons try to implicate theirs rivals in the false
cases for the purposes of disgracing them or for other purposes by
getting them detained in jails for some days. In recent times, with the
accentuation of political rivalry this tendency is showing signs of
steady increase. Apart from false cases, where there are reasonable
grounds for holding that persons accused of an offences is not likely to
abscond or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail , there seems no
justification to require him first to submit to custody, remain in
prison for some days and then apply for bail6.
In
its subsequent report the Law Commission expressed the view that the
power to grant anticipatory bail should be exercise in very exceptional
case .The Commission further observed:
“In
order to ensure that the provisions is not put to abuse at the instance
of unscrupulous petitioners ,the final order should be made only after
notice to the public prosecutor . The initial order should only be an
interim one .Further , the relevant section should make it clear that
the direction can be issue only for reasons to be recorded , and if the
court is ratified that such a direction is necessary in the interest of
justice”
According
to s.438(1) on the application for anticipatory bail can be made to the
High Court or Court of Sessions, however , normally it is to be
presumed that the court of session would be first approached for the
grant of anticipatory bail unless an adequate case is made out
straightway approaching the High Court directly without first coming
before the court of session .The full bench of the Allahabad High Court
has however taken the view that a bail application under s.438 may be
moved in the High Court without the applicant taking recourse to the
Court of Session7 for anticipatory bail is rejected , the applicant can again approach the High Court under s.438(1) as there is no bar to do so8.
As bails are against arrest and detention, an appropriate court within
whose jurisdiction the arrest takes place or is apprehended or is
contemplate will also have jurisdiction to grant bail to the person
concerned .Therefore ,the High Court or the Court of Session having
jurisdiction over the place where the arrest is apprehended by the
applicant has jurisdiction to entertain application for anticipatory
bail even though the F.I.R. might have been registered at a place within
the jurisdiction of another High Court or Court o Session .The opinion
express by the Supreme Court in some cases seems to favour the view that
the question of granting anticipatory bail to any person who allegedly
concerned with the offence must for all practical purposes considered by
the courts within whose territorial jurisdiction offence could have
been perpetrated
……………the
fact that a court has either taken cognizance of the complaint or the
investigating agency has filed a charge sheet , would not by itself _,
in our opinion, prevent the concerned courts from granting anticipatory
bail in appropriate cases. The gravity of the offence is an important
factor to be taken into consideration while granting such anticipatory
bail so also the need for custodial interrogation ,but these are also
only factors that be born in mind by the concerned Courts while
entertaining a petition for grant of anticipatory bail and the fact of
taking cognizance of filing of charge-sheet can not by themselves be
construed as a prohibition against the grant of anticipatory bail
………….we
respectfully agree with the observations of this Court in the said Case
that duration of anticipatory bail should be normally limited till the
trial Court has the necessary material before it to pass such orders and
it thinks fit on the material available before it . that is only a
restriction in regard to blanket anticipatory bail for an unspecified
period . This judgement in our opinion does not support the extreme
argument addressed on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent
State the Courts specified in s. 438.of Cr.P.C. are denude of their
power under the said section where either the cognizance is taken by the
concerned Court or charge-sheet is filed before the appropriate Court
.As stated above this would only amount to defeat the very object for
which s. 438.was introduced in Cr.P.C. in the year 1973.9
Section
437and s.439 of,Cr.P.C 1974 made provision for grant of bail In the Cr.
P.C 1898 there was no provision corresponding to s. 438, which may be
conveniently described as a provision for the of anticipatory bail
.Under the 1898 Code there was a conflict of judicial opinion whether
Courts had power to grant anticipatory bail, but the majority view was
that court had no such power The Law Commission in its 41th report dated
24 Sept.1969 pointed out the necessity of introducing the provision and
it annex draft of the proposed section to its report . In principle the
Central Govt. accepted the recommendations of the Law Commission and
embodied it in the draft bill to the Cr P.C, The Law Commission in Para
91 of its 48th report( 1973) made certain comments on the Bill,10
“ It
was urged before the Full Bench that the appellant were men of
substance and position and were not likely to abscond. The Full Bench
rejected the contention “The possession of high status, according to the
Full Bench, is not only an irrelevant consideration for granting
anticipatory bail but is ,if any thing, an aggravating circumstances”
Since the sub clause agreed with the Full Bench proposition No 2, it
would be convenient to deal with it first : Proposition(2) was
niethers.438 nor any other provision of the Code authorise the grant of
blanket anticipatory bail for offences not yet committed or with regard
to accusation not so far leveled”. In Gurbax Singh v/s State of Panjab11 ,Chandra Chud C.J.I observed
“We
agree that the ‘blanket order ‘ of anticipatory bail should not
generally be passed.. This flows from the very language of the section.
Which……requires
the applicant to show that he has reason to believe that he may be
arrested ………That is why , normally, a direction should not issue under
s.438(1) to the effect that the applicant shall be released on bail
whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever. That is why,
normally, a direction should not issue under s.438 (1) to the effect
that the applicant shall be released on bail ‘whenever arrested for
whichever offence whatsoever. That is ment by a ‘blanket order of
anticipatory bail. But specific event and facts must be disclosed by the
applicant in order to enable the court to judge of the reasonableness
of his belief, the existence of which is the sine qua non of the
exercise of power conferred by s.438. A Blanket order of anticipatory
bail is bound to cause serious interference with both and the duty of
the police in matter of investigation because regardless of what kind of
offences is alleged to have been committed by the applicant and when
order of bail which comprehend allegedly unlawful activity of any
description whatsoever ,will prevent the police from arresting the
applicant even if he commit ,say a murder in the presence of the public
.Such an order can then become a Charter of Lawlessness and a weapon to
stifle prompt investigation into offences which couldn’t possibly be
predicted when the order was passed. Therefore ,the Court which grant
anticipatory bail must take care to specify the offence or offences in
respect of which alone the order will be effective .the power should not
be exercise in vacuum’’12
The
main controversy centered round the question whether the wide
discretion conferred on the Court by s. 438 should be cut down by
reference to s. 437 and 439. The Full Bench proposition no .3 observed:
“The
said power is not unguided or unchenalised but all the limitations
imposed in the preceding s. 437, are implicit therein must be read in to
s. 438.”
Rejecting this view Chandra Chud C.J.I observed
Arrest for a nonbailable offence involved
the question of personal liberty, and the Supreme Court had held when
dealing with Art21. That no person can be deprived of his liberty except
by procedure which was fair, just and reasonable. S. 438 .provide a
procedure to protect the personal liberty by a procedure which is fair,
just and reasonable’’
Parliament
when enacted s. 438, had before it the provisions of s. 437, and if it
was desired to incorporate those provisions into s.438, parliament would
have done so. It was inadmissible read into s.438, when parliament
could have, but did not incorporate these. The distinction between
provisions in s.438. ordinarily order of bail and an order of
anticipatory bail is that whereas the former is granted after arrest ,
the latter is granted in anticipation of arrest ,and is , therefore
effective at the very moment of arrest the power to grant anticipatory
bail was found necessary because:
“ When
the event flow life becomes turbid, the police can be called upon to
inquire into charges arising out of political antagonism. The powerful
process of criminal law can then be perverted for achieving extraneous
ends. Attendant upon such investigation, when the police are not free
agent within their sphere of duty is a great amount of inconvenience,
harassment and humiliation .That can even take the form the parading of a
respectable in handcuffs, apparently on way to court of justice. The
foul deed is done when an adversary is exposed to social ridicule
obloquy, no matter when and whether a conviction is secured or is at all
possible. It is in order to meet such situations, though not limited to
these contingencies, that the power to grant anticipatory bail was
introduced into the Code of 1973.”
The above passage show that the position or status of a person
May
be relevant if a threatened arrest is the result of political vendetta
or revenge. However Chandrachud C.J. thought necessary to sound note of
caution:
“ There
can be no presumption that the wealthy and the mighty will submit
themselves to trial and that the humble and poor will run away from the
course of justice , any more than there can be a presumption that the
former are not likely to commit it . In his charge to the grand jury at
Salihury Assize ,1899,( to which Krishna Iyer. J. has referred to in
GudiKanti A.I.R.1978.Sc.429.) Lord Russell of Killowen said …………..it was
the duty of magistrate to admit accused person to bail , when ever
practicable ,unless there were strong ground for supporting that such
persons would not appear to take their trial .It was not the poorer
class who did not appear ,for their circumstances were such as to tie
them to the place where they carried their work they had not golden
wings with which they fly from Justice .”
Chandrachud
gave 5 cogent reasons for not laying down rules as to circumstances in
which anticipatory bail shall or should not be granted. Each case had to
be judged on its merits and the circumstances so that it was best to
leave the grant of anticipatory bail to the discretion of the Court .The
discretion has to be judiciously exercised and is subject to correction
by appeal or revision.
This
view is supported by the fact that arrest interferes. The provisions of
s. 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of
anticipatory bail to an accused that is under arrest involved a
contradictory in terms, in so far as the offences for which he is
arrested are concerned.
After
the arrest, the accused must seek remedy under s. 437. or s. 439. of
the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence
or offences for which he is arrested13.
Learned
counsel further submits that in any circumstances, at present two of
the appellants may be permitted to leave abroad and stringent conditions
may be imposed by their Court. He also submitted that one of the
appellants, namely, Mr.Prakash P. Hinduja who has filed criminal Appeal
No. 2001@S.L.P. (Cr.A.) No1868. of . 2001. would remain in this country
till further order ………..considering the facts and circumstances ,for the
time being as an intrerim measure , the appellants namely, Mr. Srichand
. P . Hinduja . (in Cr. Appeal No. 2001.@SLP (Cr.)No.1829.of 2001)and
Mr.Gopi Chand . Hiduja (in Cr.appeal.No….of
2001.@ SLPNo 1829. of 2001.) are permitted to go abroad on the
following conditions: 1. Both the Appellants would execute a Bond for a
sum of Rs. 15 crore 9Rupees fifteen crores) each with Bank Guartee for
the like amount to the satisfaction of the special Judge14 .
After
pursuing the orders of the Additional Sessions Judge dated 9. 4. 2001.
and 5.6. 2001.and records, we do not get any impression that the
judicial discretion in grating anticipatory bail was exercised are
erroneously or on any irrelevant consideration . The serious contention
advanced before us by the learned public prosecutor is that for further
investigation of the case ,custodial interrogation of the appellant is
very much required .While stating the facts in the beginning , we have
noticed that the appellant joined investigation whenever required as a
mater of fact they were interrogated on the occasions sufficient time .
The appellants were named as accused for committing offence under
s.120B,I.P.C.almost after a period of four and half months from the date
of the murder ,that too based on the discloser statement of hardened
criminal ,the statement of Kishan on whose statement the appellants were
involved in the offence was proved to be false and police got him
discharged .The submission of the learned public prosecutor that earlier
investigation made by the police officer and scrutinized by the
superior officers was faulty and mollified , is not a ground to put
against the appellants at this stage . The appellant No.1.has also
alleged that he is falsely involved in the case because of political
rivalry and was threatened for extracting money ; in that regard he had
also made complaint to the police seeking protection .Unfortunately the
High Court in the impugned order dated 21.12.2001.,canclling the
anticipatory bail granted to the appellants and in the subsequent order
dated 22.2.2002.,did not consider the contentions raised on behalf of
the parties objectively and in proper perspective and did not deal with
the reasons recorded and consideration made by the learned Additional
Session Judge in the order dated 9.4.2001.in
granting anticipatory Bail. High Court simply observed in the order
dated 21.12.2001. that Additional Session Judge Rewari has not taken all
facts into account and that he granted anticipatory bail to the
appellant on 9.4.2001.when the case was at investigation stage.”
The Court further observed:
………………Thus
in our view ,the High Court committed manifest and serious error in
passing the impugned orders setting aside the anticipatory bail granted
to the appellants by the order dated 9.4.2001. as confirmed by the dated
5.6.2001.of the learned Add. Session Judge .The impugned orders of the
High Court under the circumstances are unsustainable. It is needless to
state that observation made either by the learned Add. Sessions Judge or
the High Court or this Court in dealing with the matter relating to
grant of anticipatory bail do not impair or injured the prosecution case
or prejudice the defense at the trial. Further nothing said or observed
by the High Court or this Court shall be taken as any expression of
opinion on the merit of the case15 .
There
is nothing in s.438 to suggest that the order of anticipatory bail
shall be effective up to a particular stage or till the filing of the
challan. As soon as a person is enlarge on bail on the directions of
anticipatory bail order, It would be deemed by implication as if the
bail was granted under s.437.(1). Consequently , the bail shall be
effective till the conclusion of the trial , unless it is cancelled by
the court taking action under s.437(5) or under s.439(2) of the Code on
the grounds known to law and filing of the challan in the court is by it
self no ground to cancel the bail16.
Anticipatory
bail in the absence of s. 348, so for as the state of U.P. is
concerned, s.438.has been omitted from the code by s.9.of the U.P.
Cr.P.C. (Amendment) Act1976. The S.438. coupled with the delay in the
disposal of bail application in U.P. has prompt the bar to come up with
the plea for stay of arrest or granting interim bail
Cancellation
of anticipatory bail : Neither s.438.nor any other section in the code
makes any clear provision as to whether the order granting anticipatory
bail can be cancelled even before the regular bail is actually granted .
However, it has been held that when s.438 permits the making of an
order and the order is made for granting anticipatory bail .It is
implicit that the court making such an order is entitled upon
appropriate consideration to cancel recall the same17 . Anticipatory bail granted to a husband in a case allegedly involving dowry death came to be cancelled by the M.P. High Court18 . Following the Supreme Court decision not to grant anticipatory bail in dowry death cases as a matter of course19.
A
committing magistrate is not permitted to cancel anticipatory bail on
an accused at the time of committing the case to Session Court for trial
, if he has been granted anticipatory bail by an order of the Session
Court or of the High Court unless the order passed by the Session Court
or the High Court is of temporary nature20 .
Also s.12.A.A. of the Essential Commodities Act enacts a complete Code
in matter of grant of bail to an accused and he can be released only in
accordance with the provisions of s.12.A.A. The High Court does not have
any power or authority or jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail under
s.438. to an accused under the Essential Commodities Act21.
Sub section ( 4) of s. 12.A.A. of the Essential Commodities Act does
not exclude the operation of s. 438. and special court or the High Court
can release a person accused or suspected of commission of offence
under the Essential Commodities Act, under s.43822.“Anticipatory
bail” falls within the category of “bail”. The Court of Session has a
power to grant anticipatory bail under s.438. to a person accused of or
suspected of the commission of an offence under the Essential
Commodities Act .Such p;ower , however, may be exercised by the Special
Court in view of the provisions to cl.(d),s..12.A.A. of the Act23..
Anticipatory
Bail in the absence of s.438: So far as the state of U .P. is concerned
,s. 438. has been omitted from the Code by s. 9 of the U.P. Cr. P C.
(Amendment) Act1976. The repealing of s.438. coupled with the delay in
the disposal of bail application in U.P. has prompted the bar to come up
with the plan for stay of arrest or granting interim bail .
It
was argued that since the courts of magistrate and the court of
sessions have the jurisdiction to grant ultimate relief of bail, they
also have jurisdiction to grant limited relief short of grant of bail by
way of releasing offenders on personal bond for short periods as
immediate relief ,As soon as a person surrenders before the court , the
police loss the right to arrest . When in such cases the court releases
him he is in the custody of the court. According to this view the
release on personal bond is nothing but release on temporary bail .The
power to do this was located by the court in s.437. and s.439. This view
was , however, overturned by the full Bench decision in Vinod Narain
v/s State of U.P.2.,Wherein the Allahabad High Court , categorically
ruled that the courts can not be asked to dispose of bail applications
on the same day of their presentation in the court . Some other States
were also think on similar amendment. So far as the State of J&K is
concerned the Code does not extend to the State at all. The Jammu and
Kashmir State has its own State Code similar to the Code of Cr. P.C.1998
which does not contain any specific provision like s.438.for grant of
anticipatory bail.
High Court of Jammu and Kashmir seems to take the view that it is possible to do so24 .
The High Court read into the provisions of the State Code such a power
to grant anticipatory bail. According to the High Court ,a person who is
not actually arrested by the police but apprehends arrest may “appear”
in court and ask for bail in such a case the person ,according to the
High Court, in fact surrenders to the custody of the court and there by
there would be notional detention of the person .In such a situation
,the requirement of “appearing” envisaged by s.437&438.of the Code
of 1973. is satisfied ,and in the absence of any specific provision for
granting anticipatory bail the High Court of Jammu &Kashmir has in a
way succeeded in achieving the result aims at by the provision for
anticipatory bail .The question whether an application for anticipatory
bail rejected by the Session Court can be entertained by the J&K
High Court has been answer in the affirmative25..
The
provision for granting anticipatory bail are not applicable to the
offences under Scheduled Caste &Scheduled Tribes (prevention of
Atrocities, Act 1989). Vide S.18 thereof This has been held to be
constitutional26 .However, the potential for its abuse came to be discussed by the then Rajasthan High Court27 .
It
is submitted with respect that the object of Sec 438 (1) is to grant
anticipatory bail in anticipation or apprehension of the arrest. But the
honourable Supreme Court and the High Court in their respective
judgements mentioned above have absevered that anticipatory bail can
also be granted after arrest . Also the court absevered that the
petioner must surrender before the court before granting anticipatory
bail. It is submitted with respect that observations defeat the very
purpose of Sect 438 Going throw the report of the Law Commission it
seems that the anticipatory bail is granted to save the haves from the
oppression of the opponents. Further seeing the report of the Law
Commission it can be presumed that Sec only says that have will appear
before the court whenever required and the poor will run away from the
court .Which is against the concept of social justice.
1 Seervai.H.M, Constitutional Law of India.Vol 2 4th edd 2008
2 P.V Narsinha Rao V\S Delhi Admi. 1997. Criminal Law Journal 961(Delhi)
3 Thayyanbadi Mithal Kunshiraman V\S Supretendent of Police 1985 Criminal law Journal p1 Ker
4 Padma Charan Panda V\S Ram Mohan Rao 1987 Criminal Law Journal 923
5 Gurbax Singh Sibbia V\S State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565
6 48th Report of the Law Commission p10 para 31
7 Onkar Nath Agarwal V\S State, 1976 Criminal Law Journal 1142(All)
8 Jabir Ahmad Bhat V\S State of J&K 1990 Cr. Law. J.p103(J&K)
9 AIR 2003 S.C.4663-64
10 Law Commission Report 1969 pp1636-37
11 Gurbax Singh Sibbia V\S State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565
12 48th Report p 10 para 31
13 Seervai.H.M, Constitutional Law of India.Vol 2 4th edd 2008
14 A.I.R. 2003.Sc.4663-64.
15 AIR 2003 S.C. 18 at pp 23-24
16 C.H. Shiva Parsad V\S State of A.P 1999 Cr. Law.J. 1263 (A.P)
17 Dukhi Sham Benupani V\S Arun Kumar Bajoria (1998) 1Scc 52
18 Chain Singh V\S Hargobind (1991) Cr Law J. 33(M.P)
19 Samunder Singh V\S State of Rajasthan (1987) 1Scc 466
20 V. Chinna Reddy V\S N. Vidya Sagar Reddy (1982) Cr Law J. 2183
21 S.A. Ismial V\S Inspector Police Vigilence Cell (1984) Cr Law J. 1855 (A.P)
22 Kamar Chand V\S State (1987) Cr Law J. 1561 (M.P)
23 Piyupi Kanti Dey V\S State (1964) Cr Law J. 64 (Cal)
24 Kali Dass V\S H.S.O. Police Station 1979 Cr Law J. 345(J&K)
25 Juber Ahmed Bhatt V\S State of J&K 1990 Cr Law J. 103 (J&K)
26 State of M.P. v\s Ram Kishan Balothia (1995) 3Scc 221
27 F.Girdhari Lal V\S State or Rajasthan (1996)Cr Law.J 1613(Raj).
Total shows: 336
Author: Dr. Prem Nath Associate Professor ,Department of Laws ,Panjab University Chandigarh
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