ARCHANA RANA VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASE LAW 102 SC
JUDGMENT DATE: 1 – 03 - 2021
JUDGES BENCH: M.R.SHAH, J. & DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD,J.
ISSUE:
Whether the alleged averments in complaint satisfies the ingredients of the offences under Section 419 & 420 IPC or not?
JUDGEMENT: The Supreme Court held that where the allegations were made against the appellant’s husband and not her, the proceedings ought to be quashed. In this case an appeal was filed seeking the quashing of charge sheet and proceedings under Sections 419, 420, 323, 504, and 506, IPC against appellant and her husband. The Court reiterated that for an offence under Section 420 to be constituted, the accused had committed the offence of cheating under Section 415 and also the  person cheated must be dishonestly induced to deliver property or to form , alter, or destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security.
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PUNALUR PAPER MILLS LTD.   VS.  WEST BENGAL MINERAL DEVELOPMENT   AND TRADING CORPORATION LTD
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASE LAW 107 SC
JUDGMENT DATE:  01- 03- 2021
JUDGES BENCH: R.F. NARIMAN, J. &  B.R. GAVAI,J.
ISSUE:
  • Whether after the expiry of 25 years from the date of requisition, were the appellants liable to vacate the requisitioned property being the said property?
  • Are respondent / writ petitioner no. 1 entitled to any compensation on WBMDTCL having overstayed at the said property after expiry of 25 years from the date?
JUDGMENT: 
The division bench held that from the date of insertion of Section 10B  of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act 1947, the State was on notice that the premises would have to be released before 15.08.1998 and that the state had  25 years to act and acquire the premises. Hence, the State issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act without invoking the urgency provision and after the expiry of the requisition period wouldn’t wash away the lethargy of the State in initiating acquisition proceedings.
The Supreme Court held that the compensation for illegal occupation of premises cannot be assessed by the District Judge under Section 11(1) (b) of the West Bengal Act as the section has refers to compensation during the period of requisition. And after the property does not continue to remain with the State without any authority of law after the expiry of the requisition period. 
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SHIVAJI CHITAPPA PATIL VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASE LAW 110 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE:  2 – 03- 2021
JUDGES BENCH:  R.F.NARIMAN, J. & B.R.GAVAI, J.
ISSUE: Whether the Section 106 of Evidence Act is concerned, the initial burden is discharge by the prosecution?
JUDGEMENT: The Court held that in view of the facts that there were no marks on the body suggesting violence o struggle, the medical expert ruling out possibility of suicidal death, the post-mortem report stating the cause of death as ‘asphyxia due to hanging’, in light of this evidence the Trial Court as well as the High Court erred in holding that the prosecution has to proved the death of deceased was homicidal.
Therefore, it could be seen that Section 106 of Evidence Act does not directly engaged  against either a husband or wife staying under the same roof and being the last person seen with the deceased. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt, so it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, will sustain a conviction or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused.
Hence, the Court reiterated some important laws:
  • The interplay of the “last seen theory” and Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Bench held that it was settled that Section 106 did not “absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt” and it was only when the “prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused.”
  • Section 313, CrPC, “false explanation or non-explanation can only be used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused” and the same “…cannot be used as a link to complete the chain.”
  • In a case of direct evidence, the motive would not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence; motive plays an important link to complete the chain of circumstances.
The Supreme Court held that  let alone establishing chain of events which are so interwoven to each other leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has failed even to prove a single accusation  circumstance beyond reasonable doubt. As such the court has allowed the appeal and the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court as affirmed by the High Court is set aside.
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ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PRIVATE LIMITED VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASE LAW 112 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE:  2 – 03 - 2021
JUDGES BENCH: R.F.NARIMAN, J., HEMANT GUPTA, J. & B.R. GAVAI, J.
ISSUE: Whether   the assessee purchased only a right to use the copyright i.e. the software and not the entire copyright itself ?
JUDGEMEMT: The Court held that though the transaction was the software “’licensed’ by the foreign, non-resident supplier to the supplier and purchased to the resident end-user, or directly supplied to the native “end-user”, the “real nature of transaction” was the “sale of the sale of a physical object which contains an embedded computer program, and is therefore, a purchase of products.
Therefore, the Court held as follows:
  • Under Article 12 of Indian –Singapore DTAA  the definition of “royalties” said  that it  was clear that there was no obligation on the persons mentioned in Section 195 of the Income Tax Act to reduce  tax at source, as the distribution agreements/EULAs in the facts of these cases failed to create any interest or right in such distributors/end-users, which might amount to the use of or right to use any copyright
  • The amounts paid by resident Indian end-users/distributors to non-resident computer software manufacturers/suppliers, as consideration for the resale/use of the computer software through EULAs/distribution agreements, was not the payment of royalty for the utilization  of copyright within the computer software, and that the same does not give rise to any income taxable in India, as a result of which the persons referred to in Section 195 of the Income Tax Act were not liable to deduct any TDS under Section 195 of the Income Tax Act.
On an analysis of various judgments, the Bench clarified the law relating to copyright.
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SUBODH KUMAR VS.  SHAMIM AHMED
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 116 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 3 – 03 - 2021
JUDGE BENCH: ASHOK BHUSHAN. J & R.SUBASH REDDY.J
ISSUE:
Whether in the application filed by the respondent tenant under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC the requirements as contained in Proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, were complied with?
JUDGEMENT: The Court held that the appellant-landlord had filed a suit for possession, rent and mesne profit against the respondent-tenet in 1994. The trial court after affording several opportunities to the tenant to file a written statement decreed the suit ex-parte in favor of the landlord. Under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC the tenant applied for setting aside the ex-parte decree was dismissed and as also the application seeking the review of such rejection. After this respondent of tenant then approached the High Court under it’s writ jurisdiction against both these orders. The tenant’s Write Petition was allowed by High Court, setting aside the rejection of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 and remanded the application to be considered afresh. The landlord’s application seeking review of the High Court’s judgment was also rejected, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court. The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court noting that the trial court had rightly rejected the application under Order 9 Rule 13 since the application had failed to meet the requirement set out in proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act 1887 with such an application.
The Court basically relied on Kedarnath (2002) 2 SCC 16 to state that the compliance of the proviso under Section 17 to be mandatory in nature. Further the Court held that even on merits, the trial court was correct to reject the application noting that the tenant had been given several opportunities to file a written statement. The Court even noted that the tenant’s submission regarding deposit of the rent under Section 30 (2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 during the pending of the suit was also liable to be abandoned since the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 was not applicable on the subject-property and additionally, the rents deposited still fell short of the decretal amount to be deposited.
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AMWAY INDIA ENTERPRISE PVT. LTD  VS. RAVINDRANATH RAO SINGHIA
CITATION:  2021 LATEST CASELAW 117 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 4 – 03 -  2021
JUDGE BENCH: R. F. NARIMAN, J.  &  B.R.GAVAI, J.
ISSUE: Whether the claimants are entitled to file this claim as the Consortium of L&T and Scomi Engineering Bhd?
JUDGEMENT: The Court held that the appointment of a sole arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the Delhi High Court, was challenged inter alia on the ground that the same related to an international commercial arbitration, which was covered under Section 2(1)(f)(i), since the respondents were habitually resident and nationals of the USA. It had been held by the High Court u/s 2(1)(f)(iii)  that it had been exercised  since the central management and control of body of individuals dispute was not an international commercial arbitration.
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UNION OF INDIA VS P. BALASUBRAHMANAYAM
CITATION : 2021 LATEST CASELAW 118 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 4- 03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: JUSTICE. S.K.KAUL & JUSTICE. HRISHIKESH ROY 
ISSUE: Whether the Respondent were made charges of bribery out against the charges relating to procedural lapse ?
JUDGEMENT: The Court held that the respondent had been issued a charge memo by the Disciplinary Authority, Department of Posts under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 which associated with both procedural lapses in discharge of his duties likewise as alleged illegal gratification by way of bribes. An adverse report was issued against the Respondent on culmination of the departmental proceedings where no charges of bribery were made out against the respondent but all charges regarding procedural lapses were held to own been proved. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad(“CAT”) held the conclusion to be just and proper, but reduced the penalty imposed on the respondent. The judicature put aside the order of the CAT and directed the reinstatement of the respondent by holding that since the fees had a vigilance angle, the identical couldn't been issued without prior approval of the Chief Vigilance Officer as mandated by a circular dated 18.01.2005 of the Department of Posts, Ministry of Communication.
The Supreme Court put aside the order gone along the court by stating that since negligence of the respondent in performing his duties had been proved, it had been not appropriate for the judicature to convey the respondent a clean chit as a consequence of the Circular not being followed, because the same wouldn't are done if the costs had only been regarding procedural lapses and not bribery.
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V.N. PATIL  VS  K. NIRANJAN KUMAR AND ORS.
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASE LAW 119 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 4 – 03 -  2021
JUDGE BENCH: INDU MALHOTRA, J. &  AJAY RASTOGI ,J.
ISSUE:
Whether under Section 311 of  CrPC the discretionary power vested which had to be exercised judicially ?
JUDGEMENT: The Supreme Court put aside the order of the tribunal by stating that prime Court had not adverted to the factual matrix noticed by the magistrate and put aside the identical, summarily, without assigning any reasons, which couldn't facilitate the Court to know the explanation behind such reversal. during this case the daughter of the appellant had died an unnatural death while residing with the Respondents who were facing trial under Sections 498A, 304B, 302 r/w Section 34, IPC and under Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The trial itself was at the top of its closure when an application was filed by the general public Prosecutor under Section 173(5) read with Section 311 of CrPC for summoning the witnesses together with the concerned documents to adduce their evidence in reference to the second post-mortem conducted on the body of the deceased. The order allowing the applying by the judicature was put aside by the supreme court. and also the aim of each Court is to get the reality. Under Section 311 CrPC is one amongst many such provisions which strengthen the arms of a court in its effort to unearth the reality by procedure sanctioned by law. At the identical time, the discretionary power vested under Section 311 CrPC should be exercised judiciously for strong and valid reasons and with caution and circumspection to satisfy the ends of justice.
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STATE OF TAMIL NADU  VS. K. SHOBANA
CITATION:  2021 LATEST CASE LAW 122 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 5 – 03- 2021 
JUDGE BENCH: JUSTICE. SK KAUL , JUSTICE. DINESH MAHESHWARI & JUSTICE. HRISHIKESH ROY
ISSUE:
Would Section 27 of the Act operates, and where in the list, the application of the ";first" principle would apply?
JUDGEMENT: The Court held that the word ‘first’ in Section 27(F) of the TN Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act did not pertain to the general candidates’ list/ vacancies and that Section 27 would apply only when the reservation principle began, after filing up the seats on merit. Thus, the word ";first" would apply at that stage, i.e., the backlog vacancies have to be filled in first and the current vacancies to be filled in thereafter. At the stage when the general category seats are being filled, there is thus no question of any carry forward or current vacancies for reserved category arising at all.
The Court held that in the given facts, first the merit list was to be filled in, then the backlog vacancies of the particular reserved category to be thereafter filled in ‘first’, and then the remaining reserved vacancies for the current year to be filled thereafter. 
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KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA  VS.  STATE OF UTTAR
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASE LAW 126 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 8 -03 - 2021
JUDGE BENCH:  J. MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR & J. R.SUBHASH REDDY
ISSUE:
The question in this case arises inter alia, before the Court was to consider the validity of a private complaint filed after earlier information was also filed as NCR No. 158/2012 by the same party, against the same accused, in relation to the same incident.
JUDGEMENT: The Court held that the Trial Judge has a duty under the Constitution and the CrPC, to identify and dispose of frivolous litigation at an early stage by exercising, substantially and to the fullest extent, the powers conferred on him, and should not have issued process  the appellants on the basis of such a private complaint. The Court used its powers under Article 142 to quash all the litigations between the parties arising out of the incident.
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WESTINGHOUSE SAXBY FARMER LTD  VS.  COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE CALCUTTA
CITATION:   2021 LATEST CASE LAW 127 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 8 – 03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH:  S.A.BOBDE CJI., JUSTICE. A.S. BOPANNA & JUSTICE. V. RAMASUBRAMANIAM 
ISSUE:
Whether the show cause cum demand notices issued by the Department on various dates during the period 1995, 1998 were not barred by time under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act,1944, in the absence of any fraud, collusion, willful misstatement or suppression of facts, especially since the classification list submitted by the appellant have been approved on 27.08.1993?
JUDGEMENT: In this case an appeal was filed under Section 35L(b) of the Central Excise Act 1944, against the dismissal of the appeal by the Customs Excise and Services  Tax Appellate Tribunal (“CESTAT”) under this case. Hence, the appellant company was engaged within the manufacturing of ‘Relays’ which may be classified as electrical equipment and signaling equipment, falling under Tariff Item No. 8536.90 and Item no. 8608 respectively. The question before the Court was to establish the right tariff classification of ‘Relays’ and also to see whether the show cause demand notices issued by the Department from time to time were barred under Section 11 A of the Central Excise Act 1944. Allowing the appeal, it absolutely was noted by the Court that since the competent authority had already approved the classification of Relays under Item No. 8608, it had been not proper for the authorities to now invoke Note 2 (f) of Section XVII of the Chapter laying down tariff rates.
The Court further held that the try to undo the effect of the approval of the classification done on 27.08.1993, was time barred, whether or not a number of the individual statutory notices, were issued within the amount of limitation because the invocation of Section 11 A itself was time barred.
NAGABHUSHAN  VS  STATE OF KARNATAKA
CITATION :    2021 LATEST CASELAW 129 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE:8- 03 - 2021
JUDGE BENCH: D.Y CHANDRACHUD, J. &  M.R SHAH, J.
ISSUE: Whether the act of the accused pouring water would mitigate the offence of murder ?
JUDGEMENT: In this case the challenge was to the order of conviction passed by the High Court of Karnataka, reversing the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The Appellant was charged under Section 498A and Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Appellant had argued inter alia that there were material contradictions in the two dying declarations made by the deceased and the second one should not have been relied upon by the High Court. While dismissing the appeal, the Court held that the High Court had given cogent reasons for relying on the second dying declaration in light of the medical evidence and injuries sustained by the deceased, as evident from the post-mortem report.
The Court further held that after pouring kerosene on the deceased and thereafter setting her ablaze, merely because the Accused might have tried to extinguish the fire will not take the case out of the clutches of clause fourthly of Section 300 of the IPC.
GUJARAT URJA VIKAS NIGAM LTD  VS.  MR. AMIT GUPTA
CITATION :   2021 LATEST CASELAW 130 SC         
JUDGEMENT DATE: 8- 03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH:  DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. & M.R SHAH, J.
ISSUE: 
  • Whether the NCLT/NCLAT can exercise jurisdiction under the IBC over disputes arising from contracts such as the PPA?
  • Whether the appellant's right to terminate the PPA in terms of Article 9.2.1(e) read with 9.3.1 is regulated by the IBC?
JUDGEMENT: In this case the challenge was to the judgment by the NCLAT under Section 61 of the IBC, upholding the NCLT’s continue the termination by the Appellant of its Power contract (PPA) with one Aston field Solar (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd.
The Court held that the NCLT/NCLAT could have exercised jurisdiction under section 60(5)(c) of the IBC to remain the termination of the PPA by the appellant, since the appellant sought to terminate the PPA under Article 9.2.1(e) only on account of the CIRP being initiated against the company Debtor.
Further, Court held that the NCLT/NCLAT correctly stayed the termination of the PPA by the appellant, since allowing it to terminate the PPA would definitely lead to the company death of the company Debtor because of the PPA being its sole contract. The Court left the broader question of the validity/invalidity of ipso facto clauses in contracts open for legislative intervention.
PRAVIN ELECTRICALS PVT. LTD  VS.  GALAXY INFRA AD  ENGINEERING PVT. LTD.
CITATION : 2021 LATEST CASE LAW  131 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 8-03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: R.F.NARIMAN, J., B.R.GAVAI, J. &  HRISHIKESH ROY, J.
ISSUE:
Whether there is an arbitration agreement and whether the party who has applied under Section 11 of the Act, is a party to such an agreement ?
JUDGEMENT: It held that a petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, for the appointment of a sole arbitrator. The appellant contended that the Consultancy Agreement, containing the alleged arbitration agreement, was a concocted agreement, and so, no article was existing. The Court examined the provisions of Sections 8 and 11 of the Act, and referred case “ Vidya Drolia (2021) 2 SCC 1” which read the ‘prima facie test’ into Section 11(6A) so on bring the provisions of Sections 8(1) and 11(6) read with 11(6A) on par. On such facts, the Court held, that it had been unsafe to conclude a way or the opposite, that an arbitration agreement existed between the parties. Relying upon the Vidya Drolia case, the Court held that a deeper examination of whether an arbitration agreement exists between the parties must be left to the arbitrator. Therefore, the Court upheld the order of the court appointing the Arbitrator, with a direction that the difficulty on the existence of the arbitration agreement shall be decided by him as a preliminary issue.
SUMETI VIJ Vs. PARAMOUNT TECH FAB INDUTRIES
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 133 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 9 -03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: INDU MALHOTRA, J. &  RASTOGI,J.
ISSUE: Whether the standard of proof for rebutting under section 139 NI Act applicable ?
JUDGEMENT: In this case the Court ruled that the quality of proof for rebutting the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was ‘preponderance of probabilities’ as was held in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441, that proceedings under Section 138 NI Act are quasi criminal in nature. during this case, because the complainant was ready to prove that the appellant had ordered goods which such goods were delivered which the cheque was issued in lieu of this transaction, which the appellant did not record evidence to rebut the presumption under Section 139. Therefore, the Court failed to interfere with the High Court’s finding that the appellant was guilty under Section 138 NI Act.
M S/S CANON INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED  VS. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
CITATION : 2021 LATEST CASELAW 134 C
JUDGEMENT DATE: 9 -03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: SA BOBDE , CJI,  AS BOPANNA , J. &  V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN,J.
ISSUE: Whether after clearance of cameras on the basis that they were exempt from levy of basic Customs duty, proceedings initiated by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence for recovery of duty under Section 28(4) Customs Act, 1962 were valid in law ?
JUDGEMENT: The Court held that the utilization of the article ‘the’ in Section 28(4) of the Act was with the intention to designate the proper officer who had assessed the products at the time of the clearance, which the correct officer needn't be the identical officer who cleared the products but might be a political candidate authorized to exercise the powers  therefore, the extra Director General of DRI wasn't the right officer to initiate recovery proceedings. The Court also held that under Section 6 of the Customs Act, the officers of the DRI weren't customs officers and thus the notice issued by them was invalid.
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. & ANR. VS. M/S NORTEL NETWORKS INDIA PVT LTD.
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASE LAW 137 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 10 - 03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: INDU MALHOTRA, J. & AJAY RASTOGI, J.
ISSUE:
  • The period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("the 1996 Act");
  • Whether the Court may refuse to make the reference under Section 11 where the claims are ex facie time-barred?
JUDGEMENT: In this case it was held that the amount of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 would be governed by Article 137 of the primary Schedule of the Limitation Act 1963 which the amount of limitation would begin to run from the date of failure to appoint an arbitrator. Even it had been also observed that the Parliament may consider amending Section 11 of the 1996 Act to supply a period of limitation for filing an application under this provision, which is in consonance with the item of expeditious disposal of arbitration proceedings. Further the Court held that in rare and exceptional cases, where the claims are ex facie time barred, and it's manifest that there's no subsisting dispute, the Court may refuse to create the reference.
PRITI SARAF AND ANR. VS. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 138 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 10 -03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: INDU MALHOTRA,J.  &  AJAY RASTOGI, J.
ISSUES: In what circumstances and categories of cases, a criminal proceeding may be quashed either in exercise of the extraordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, or in the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC.
JUDGEMENT: Though in a very series of choices, this issue has been answered on several occasions by this Court, yet the identical still comes up for consideration and is seriously debated. during this backdrop, the scope and ambit of the inherent jurisdiction of the state supreme court under Section 482 CrPC has been examined within the judgment of this Court in State of Haryana et al. Vs. Bhajan Lal et al. Here the Bench reversed the choice of the state supreme court where the latter had exercised its powers under Section 482, CrPC. The Bench held that although the facts narrated within the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet revealed an advert transaction, but that was no reason for holding that the offence of cheating wasn't made out especially when “many a times, offence of cheating is committed within the course of business transactions”.
KALPRAJ DHARAMSHI & ANR. VS.KOTAK INVESTMENT ADVISORS LTD & ANR
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 139 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 10TH MARCH 2021
JUDGE BENCH:  A.M.KHANWILKAR ,J.,  B.R.GAVAI,J. &  KRISHNA MURARI, J.
ISSUE:
Whether NCLAT was right in law in interfering with the decision of CoC of accepting the resolution plan of Kalpraj?
JUDGEMENT: The NCLAT was incorrect in law in interfering with the business decision of the Committee of Creditors. This was because Section 31 of the IBC mandated that its role be confined to verifying whether the Resolution Plan provided:
  • provided for the payment of insolvency resolution process costs in a specified manner in priority to the repayment of other debts of the corporate debtor,
  • provided for the repayment of the debts of operational creditors in prescribed manner,
  • provided for the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor,
  • provided for the implementation and supervision of the resolution plan,
  • does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for the time being in force,
  • conformed to such other requirements as may be specified by the Board.
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BHIMA RAZU PRASAD  VS.  STATE, REP. BY DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, CBI
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 140 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 12 – 03 - 2021
JUDGE BENCH: MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR J. &  VINEET SARAN J.
ISSUE: Whether Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC bars lodging of case by the investigating agency under Section 193, IPC in respect of offence of giving false evidence which is committed at the stage of the investigation, prior to production of such evidence before the Trial Court.
JUDGEMENT: In Bhima Razu Prasad v. State, rep. by Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI,   The Court relied, inter alia, upon  case Sachida Nand Singh (1998) 2 SCC 493, as affirmed by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370, which held that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) read with Section 340(1), CrPC will only apply in respect of offences which are committed during the time when the document concerned was custodia legis or in the custody of the court. Holding that the provision in Section 195(1)(b)(i) was analogous to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), the Court held that Section 195(1)(b)(i) will not bar prosecution by the investigating agency for the offence punishable under Section 193 IPC which is committed during the stage of investigation.
STATE OF GOA  VS.   FOUZIYA IMTIAZ SHEIKH AND ANR.
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 141 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE:12TH MARCH 2021
JUDGE BENCH: R.F.NARIMAN J., B.R.GAVAI J., & HARISHIKESH ROY J.
ISSUE: Whether the bar to interference by courts in electoral matters relating to delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such constituencies, specifically in the context of municipal elections.
JUDGEMENT: In this case  the Supreme Court laid down the following principles of law:
  • Under Article 243 ZG(b), no election to any municipality can be called in question except by an election petition presented to a Tribunal. This would mean that from the date of notification of the election till the date of the declaration of result a judicial hands-off is mandated by the non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG debarring the writ court under Articles 226 and 227 from interfering once the election process has begun until it is over. The constitutional bar operates only during this period.
  • If, however, the assistance of a writ court is required in subserving the progress of the election and facilitating its completion, the writ court may issue orders provided that the election process, once begun, cannot be postponed or protracted in any manner.
  • The non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG does not operate as a bar after the election tribunal decides an election dispute before it.
  • Under Article 243ZA(1), the SEC is in overall charge of the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls, and the conduct of all municipal elections. In extraordinary cases, the SEC may conduct elections after such term is over, only for good reason.
  • Judicial review of a State Election Commission’s order is available on grounds of review of administrative orders. Here again, the writ court must adopt a hands-off policy while the election process is on and interfere either before the process commences or after such process is completed unless interfering with such order subserves and facilitates the progress of the election.
  • Article 243ZA(2) makes it clear that the law made by the legislature of a State relating to or in connection with elections to municipalities, is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and in particular Article 243T, which deals with reservation of seats.
  • The bar contained in Article 243ZG(a) mandates that there be a judicial hands-off of the writ court or any court in questioning the validity of any law relating to delimitation of constituency or allotment of seats to such constituency made or purporting to be made under Article 243ZA.
  • Any challenge to orders relating to delimitation or allotment of seats including preparation of electoral rolls, not being part of the election process, can also be challenged under the statutory provisions dealing with delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such constituencies.
  • The Constitutional bar of Article 243ZG(a) applies only to courts and not the State Election Commission, which is to supervise, direct and control preparation of electoral rolls and conduct elections to municipalities.
  • It is the duty of the SEC to countermand illegal orders made by any authority including the State Government which delimit constituencies or allot seats to such constituencies.
Further, on facts, it was held that the Law Secretary of the State could not be said to be an independent State Election Commissioner.
SECUNDARABAD CANTONMENT BOARD  VS.  M/S B. RAMACHANDRAIAH  &  SONS
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 141 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 15 -03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: R.F.NARIMAN J. & B.R.GAVAI J.
ISSUE:
  • The period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("the 1996 Act");
  • Whether the Court may refuse to make the reference under Section 11 where the claims are ex facie time-barred?
JUDGEMENT: In the case the amount of limitation for filing a petition seeking appointment of an arbitrator/s can not be confused or conflated with the amount of limitation applicable to the substantive claims made within the underlying commercial contract. the amount of limitation for such claims is prescribed under various Articles of the Limitation Act, 1963. The limitation for deciding the underlying substantive disputes is necessarily distinct from that of filing an application for appointment of an arbitrator. The appellant was aggrieved by the order and judgment of the court appointing an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (“A&C Act”).
The tribunal allowed the applying noting that the prolonged silence on a part of the appellant indicated a live dispute and therefore the question of bar on limitation was left receptive be considered by the arbitrator. The Court had noted the recent judgment Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. , case was delivered on 10.03.2021 where it reiterated that the amount of limitation for an application starts running after the passing of 30 days after the request to appoint an arbitrator and it can't be confused with the amount of limitation applicable on the substantive claims. and also the Court also recalled its judgment in Vidya Drolia (2021) 2 SCC 1 where it noted that at the stage of Section 11, the restricted and review is to test and protect parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is demonstrably non-arbitrable. within the present case, the Court noted that at the very latest, the time for an application under Section 11 began to run after 30 days of the request to appoint an arbitrator. A rejection of the request by the appellant in 2010 wouldn't give any opportunity to the limitation period. Thus, the Court held that the appliance under Section 11 was hopelessly time-barred and put aside the judgment of the judicature.
ARUN KUMAR JAGATRAMKA  VS.  JINDAL STEEL AND POWER LTD
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 143 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 15 – 03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: D.Y CHANDRACHUD J., M. R. SHAH J.
ISSUE: Whether in a liquidation proceeding under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the 'l&B Code') the Scheme for Compromise and Arrangement can be made in terms of Sections 230 to 232 of the Companies Act.
JUDGEMENT: In the case, the Court was considering two appeals and a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India wherein the appellants were aggrieved by the judgments of the National Companies Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) holding that promoters who are ineligible to propose a resolution plan under Section 29A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (“IBC”) were also not eligible to file an application for compromise and arrangement under Section 230 to 232 of the businesses Act 2013, where the liquidation has been initiated under the IBC. Under Article 32 of the Constitution the petitioner, challenged the constitutional validity of the Regulation 2B of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations 2016 (“Liquidation Regulations”), which after the amendment in 2020 states that an individual ineligible to submit a resolution plan can't be a celebration to a compromise or arrangement. The Court remarked its decisions in Chitra Sharma (2018) 18 SCC 575, ArcelorMittal (2019) 2 SCC 1 to state that Section 29A of the IBC must be interpreted purposively to exclude persons whose misconduct has contributed to the defaults on a part of the debtor from participating within the resolution process. The Court also said Swiss Ribbons (2019) 4 SCC 17 where the Court had held that the norm underlying Section 29A of the IBC would permeate Section 35 (1) (f) yet, i.e. to liquidation additionally. The Court had also upheld the validity of the Regulation 2B of the Liquidation Regulations, as being only clarificatory in nature and satisfying the necessities under Section 240 (1) of the IBC, i.e., of being in keeping with the IBC and being made to hold out the provisions of the IBC. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals and therefore the petition under Article 32.
SARTAJ SINGH VS.THE STATE OF HARYANA
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 145 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 15 -03 - 2021
JUDGE BENCH:  D.Y CHANDRACHUD J. & M.R  . SHAH J.
ISSUE:
What is the stage at which power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised?
JUDGEMENT: In this case the appellant was the original informant who alleged that he was attacked by a group of men including the private respondents in the matter. Based on appellant’s statement he had name the accused, including the private respondents, an FIR for offences under Section 149, 341, 323, 324,307 and 506 of the IPC was filed. After that , the charge sheet was filed against several accused but not the private respondents.
Section 319 CrPC springs out of the doctrine judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur (Judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted) and this doctrine must be used as a beacon light while explaining the ambit and the spirit underlying the enactment of Section 319 CrPC. In the opinion of Court, Section 319 CrPC is an enabling provision empowering the court to take appropriate steps for proceeding against any person not being an accused for also having committed the offence under trial.
The High Court by the impugned order set aside the order under Section 319, CrPC, which was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Court referred to its detailed judgment in Hardeep Singh (2014) 3 SCC 92 to reiterate that the Court can exercise the power under Section 319, CrPC on the basis of the statement made in examination in chief and need not wait till such statement is cross-examined, provided that on the basis of the material before the Court including the statement made in examination in chief, it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused facing trial. The Court allowed the petition and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court.
PRAMOD KUMAR SINGH VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
CITATION:  2021 LATEST CASELAW 147 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE:  16 – 03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: U.U.LALIT J., S.RAVINDRA BHAT J. & HARISHIKESH ROY J.
ISSUE: Which were the candidates initially selected in their respective vertical reserved categories (OBC/SC/ST), but depending on their merit, were found entitled to be put in 'Open Category.
JUDGEMENT: In this case the Court held that a petition was filed seeking, a direction to the respondents to consider the petitioners for appointment to the post of Constable PAC and Fireman seats meant for General Category Male Candidates in PAC and Fireman Posts which remained unfilled till date. It was alleged that certain number of candidates coming from ‘Reserved Categories’, who were initially selected against Reserved Categories’ seats, were now shown against the ‘open category' in the list published on 11.11.2019 which prejudiced the chances of ‘open category’ candidates.
The Court  dismiss the petition and held that the selection in respect of the posts were in accordance with the directions issued by the Court and if the candidates were already selected against reserved posts were either  entitled to be considered against open category posts, that exercise cannot be termed as illegal or invalid on any count.
GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA (WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT) REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE ENGINEER VS. M/S BORSE BROTHERS ENGINEERS & CONTRACTORS PVT. LTD.
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 151 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 19 -03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH:  R.F.NARIMAN ,J., B.R.GAVAI, J. & HRISHIKESH ROY,J.
ISSUE: Whether the scheme of a Commercial Courts Act includes the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act ?
JUDGEMENT: The Supreme Court in this case held that the application of  Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not expelled by the scheme of Commercial Court Act which therefore means that the delay of filling appeals under section 13 of Commercial Courts Act can be excused by showing the sufficient clause as per section 5 of limitation Act.
SESH NATH SINGH  VS.  BAIDYABATI SHEORAPHULLI CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 154 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 22 -03-  2021
JUDGE BENCH: INDIRA BANERJEE, J. & HEMANT GUPTA, J.
ISSUE: Whether the Section 14 of Limitation Act 1963 applies to application under Section 7 of IBC. If so the exclusion of time under section 14 is available , only after the proceedings before the wrong forum terminate.
JUDGEMENT: The Bench held during this case that Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 doesn't make it mandatory to file an application in writing before relief may be granted. Advocating for a purposive interpretation of Section 14 of the Limitation 1963 rather than a narrow and pedantic one, the Bench held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings under the IBC within the NCLT/NCLAT. It further noted that seeable of the ambit of the proceedings under the IBC before NCLT/NCLAT, the expression “court” in Section 14(2) would be deemed to be any forum for a civil proceeding including any Tribunal or any forum under the SARFAESI Act. it absolutely was further noted that Section 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act weren't mutually exclusive and even in cases where Section 14 failed to strictly apply, the principles of Section 14 can be invoked to grant relief to an applicant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by purposively construing ‘sufficient cause’ because it was settled that omission to sit down with the right section of a statute doesn't vitiate an order.
CHAIRMAN ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE UP MILK UNION & DIARY FEDERATION CENTRALIZED SERVICES VS. JAGPAL SINGH
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 155 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 23 – 03 2021
JUDGE BENCH: UU LALIT ,J. , HEMANT GUPTA, J. & S RAVINDRA BHATT, J.
ISSUE: Whether an order where the respondent was ordered to be reverted to the minimum pay scale and the period of suspension was to be considered as a period spent by the employee in service.
JUDGEMENT: The respondent employee was penalized for having a hidden chamber of milk within the tanker which caused financial losses to the Federation. The Court ruled that Section 122 of the Act and Rule 389-A of the principles empower the State to constitute an authority for recruitment, training and disciplinary control of the workers of Co-Operative Societies. Under Rule 15 of the Dairy Service Rules, the Chairman of the executive Committee was the Appointing and Disciplinary Authority. The Court held that Rule 15 doesn't contemplate the Chairman to own prior concurrence of any authority.
NETAJI ACHYUT SHINDE ( PATIL) & ANR.  VS  STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
CITATION : 2021 LATEST CASELAW 156 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 23 -03-2021
JUDGE BENCH: L.NAGESHWAR RAO ,J., HEMANT GUPTA, J., & S. RAVINDRA     BHAT ,J.
ISSUE: Whether the appellants are correct, in arguing that the initial intimation received by the police on telephone (at 5.45 P.M.) on the day of the incident, constituted an FIR.
JUDGEMENT: The Court held that the appellants challenged the common judgment of the judicature convicting them of committing offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The tribunal had acquitted appellant no. 1 and three while convicting only the appellant no. 2. The court vide the impugned judgment had reversed the acquittals while upholding appellant no.2’s conviction. After considering the complete evidence on record, the Court dismissed the appeals and confirmed the convictions.
The Court said it's incorrect to suggest that the primary information received by the police at 5.45 pm by phone should be treated because the FIR which the police had improved upon the case in registering the FIR at 11.30 pm. the choice in TT Antony (2001) 6 SCC 181 , Court recalled that can't be treated as an FIR. The Court also rejected the trial court’s reasoning supported by the appellants that no injury on the deceased was attributable specifically to the accused. The Court relied on Ramaswami Ayaangar (1976) 3 SCC 779 to reiterate that to draw in Section 34 of the IPC, it's not necessary that accused must assault the victim but they have to have shared a typical intention with which they acted. The Court noted that the court had erred in ignoring the ocular testimony establishing the role of the appellants within the commission of the offence. The Court noted it’s judgment in Sawant Singh (1961) 3 SCR 129 regarding the facilitys of the court where the judicature has recorded acquittal to notice that the supreme court has the power to review the evidence on which an order of acquittal is founded and stated that the tribunal had correctly reversed the acquittal of the appellants.
UTTAR PRADESH AWAS EVAM VIKASH PARISHAD VS. ASHA RAM (D) THROUGH LRS
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 157 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 23 – 03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: U.U.LALIT , J., HEMANT GUPTA, J. & S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
ISSUE: Whether the High Court was right to enhance the rate from the rate recorded in Exhibits A-1 and A-2 by Rs 10,000 per acre per year for three years.
JUDGEMENT: In this case the Court had considered 51 appeals all told wherein the supreme court by the impugned judgment had determined the compensation of Rs. 297 per sq. yard to be paid to the respondents. The proceedings arose out of land acquired by the petitioner vide a notification dated 26.06.1982 under Section 28 of the U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam 1965 (the “Act”) and subsequently under Section 32 of the Act. In 1989, the Special Land Acquisition Officer determined the compensation of Rs. 50 per sq. yard and Rs. 35 per sq. yard for parcels larger than 8 acres. Aggrieved the respondents sought a Reference for determination of the market price. the extra District Judge awarded compensation of Rs.120/- per sq. yard. Dissatisfied with the compensation the respondents appealed before the court. The supreme court confirmed the compensation. within the SLP against the judgment of the judicature, the Court remitted the matters back to the judicature with a direction to think about additional documents filed by the respondents. The supreme court reconsidered the matters and awarded a sum of Rs. 297/- per sq. yard. Hearing the appeals against the common judgment, the Court observed its judgments including, Smt. Tribeni Devi & Ors. (1972) 1 SCC 480 to list the methods of valuation to be adopted to establish the market price of land, including opinion of experts and price paid by bonafide purchasers of lands adjacent to lands acquired at a time reasonably near the notification of acquisition. The Court noted that the respondents had didn't adduce the extra documents before the tribunal and moreover, a number of sale instances spoken were much later in time and will not be considered. The Court also noted that there was nothing on record to indicate the potentiality of the lands acquired or that there was industrial development within the area. The Court observed that the Reference Court had determined the compensation after taking relevant factors into consideration including the dimensions of the lands being acquired. The Court allowed the appeals and restored the compensation awarded by the Reference Court at Rs. 120 per sq. yard.
PATRICIA MUKKIM  VS.  STATE OF MEGHALAYA
CITATION : 2021 LATEST CASELAW 163 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE:  25  -03 -  2021
JUDGE BENCH: L. NAGESWARA RAO, J. & S.RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
ISSUE: What it considered to be a workable approach in interpreting "hatred" as is used in legislative provisions prohibiting hate speech.
JUDGEMENT: In this case the dispute pertained to a Facebook by a journalist about an assault on some youth. The Court held that the intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is sine qua non of the offence under Section 153A, IPC.
The Court clarified that strongly worded or isolated passages couldn't be accustomed prove a charge under Section 153A which the full piece must be checked out. relaying upon the case Bilal Ahmed Kaloo and Ramesh v Union of India (1988) 1 SCC 668, the Court held that merely inciting feelings of 1 community or group without relevance another community wouldn't attract Section 153A which the alleged criminal speech should be judged from the standards of the reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous man.
The Court had also relied upon Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014) 11 SCC 477 and held that the interpretation of the word ‘hatred’ must be to interpret the speech objectively and ask whether an affordable person responsive to the context would view the speech as exposing a protected group to hatred. The second test would be to limit interpretation of the term to extreme manifestations of detestation and vilification. The third test would be to specialize in the effect of the speech in dispute. supported these principles, the Court ruled that there was no intention on the a part of the appellant to incite violence and thus the ingredients of Sections 153A and 505(1)(c) weren't made out.
LT. COL. NITISHA VS.  UNION OF INDIA
CITATION : 2021 LATEST CASELAW 165 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 25 – 03 -  2021
JUDGE BENCH: D.Y.CHANRACHUD , J. &  M.R.SHAH, J.
ISSUE: Whether the procedure which was followed in evaluating the women SSCOs comports with the requirements of law. In arriving at this determination, we will primarily be guided by the Army Orders, Army Instructions and policy letters of the Union Government which have been set out above and will be further explained below.
JUDGEMENT: The Court held that the method of evaluating WSSCOs for the grant of PC was by a belated application of general policy which didn't redress the harms of gendered discrimination that the Court had identified in Babita Puniya (2020) 7 SCC 469 and such a belated and formal application caused indirect discrimination. The Court also held that the benchmarking criterion of comparing female candidates with the last male counterparts from the corresponding batch was required only if the amount of eligible female officers exceeded the cap of 250 officers who would be granted PC annually.
The Court held that it's to seem at the effect of the concerned criteria, not at the intent underlying its adoption. Since such a pattern of evaluation would exclude from the grant of PC on grounds beyond their control, it had been indirectly discriminatory against WSSCOs. The Court ruled that every one woman officers who have fulfilled the cut-off grade of 60 per cent within the Special No 5 Selection Board in September 2020 shall be entitled to the grant of PC, subject to their meeting the medical criteria. For the aim of determining medical criteria, it shall be at the time of 5th year of service or at 10th year of service because the case is also.
NARESH KUMAR VS.  KALAWATI
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 164 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 25 – 03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: NAVIN SINHA, J. & KRISHNA MURARI, J.
ISSUE: Whether a dying declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
JUDGEMENT: In this case an appeal had been filed challenging the acquittal of the respondents in charges under Sections 498A and 302 read with Section 34, IPC. The Court reiterated that though its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution was vide, it'd not interfere with concurrent findings of facts found out by two courts, unless there was a whole misappreciation of evidence, gross perversity in arriving at the findings, causing serious miscarriage of justice.
The Court held that while a dying declaration can form the premise of conviction if made voluntarily and inspires confidence, during this case, the deceased’s dying declaration had no respect to either the respondent or dowry demand, wasn't signed by anyone, the doctor to whom the statement was made wasn't examined, because the witness who recorded the declaration failed to state that the deceased was in an exceedingly fit state of mind. Therefore, the Court held that the veracity and truthfulness of the dying declaration remained suspect and also the probable defence couldn't be rejected.
JAGMOHAN SINGH DHILLON ETC. ETC.  VS.  SATWANT SINGH & ORS.
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 167 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE:  26 – 03-  2021
JUDGE BENCH: ASHOK BHUSHAN, J., S . ABDUL NAZEER, J. & HEMANT GUPTA, J.
ISSSUE: Whether for the vacancies which were advertised under 1982 Rules, the reservation for the Armed Forces Personnel shall be twenty percent or fifteen percent and whether the benefit of ex-servicemen as contained in 1982 Rules shall be applicable with respect to vacancies which arose prior to enforcement of 1982 Rules.
JUDGEMENT: In this case the Bench upheld the Division Bench’s judgment and disagreed with the Single Judge as the appellant was found to be not entitled to claim the benefit of military service for the purpose of seniority for appointment to the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) since the benefit of Rule 4(1) of 1972 Rules was not continued in 1982 Rules, and that the appellant’s seniority was to be governed by the statutory rules applicable after the enforcement of the 1982 Rules. This was so because seniority and appointment were completely different concepts.
INDUS BIOTECH PRIVATE LIMITED VS.  KOTAK INDIA VENTURE (OFFSHORE) FUND (EARLIER KNOWN AS KOTAK INDIA VENTURE LIMITED) & ORS.
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 168 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 26 -03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: S.A. BOBDE, CJI. A.S. BOPANNA, J. & V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
ISSUE: Should the adjudicating authority first decide the application under 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996(2) (the A & C ACT ), before deciding the application under section 7 of THE INSOLVENCY AND BANK RUPTCY COURT 2016 (3(IBC)).
JUDGEMENT: In this Case the Court relied upon Vidya Drolia to carry that a dispute would be non arbitrable when a proceeding is in rem and an IBC proceeding would be in rem only if the petition is admitted. The Bench “…clarified that in any proceeding which is pending before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 7 of IB Code, if such petition is admitted upon the Adjudicating Authority recording the satisfaction with relevancy the default and also the debt being due from the company debtor, any application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 made thereafter won't be maintainable. in a very situation where the petition under Section 7 of IB Code is yet to be admitted and, in such proceedings, if an application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 is filed, the Adjudicating Authority is duty certain to first decide the applying under Section 7 of the IB Code by recording a satisfaction with relation to there being default or not, whether or not the appliance under Section 8 of Act, 1996 is kept along for consideration. In such event, the natural consequence of the consideration made therein on Section 7 of IB Code application would befall on the appliance under Section 8 of the Act, 1996.” Further, seeable that the character of the problems involved being mainly with respect to the conversion of preferred shares into equity shares and also the formula to be worked there under, the Bench held that the consideration may be resolved by the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of same members but separately constituted in respect of every agreement.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH  VS.  JAIL SUPERINTENDENT (ROPAR)
CITATION : 2021 LASTEST CASELAW 169 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE:  26 – 03-  2021
JUDGE BENCH: ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. & R. SUBHASH REDDY, J.
ISSUE: Whether this writ petition filled by the state of Uttar Pradesh under Article 32 of the Constitution Of India r/w Section 406 of IPC is maintainable or not.
JUDGEMENT: In this case the Bench held as follows:
  • The petition before it under Article 32 of the Constitution was maintainable under Section 406, CrPC as the Uttar Pradesh State Government was certainly a “party interested” as per Section 406, CrPC.
  • The relief sought in the accompanying petition could not be granted under Section 406, CrPC as the case was at the stage of investigation in Punjab.
  • The Bench was invoking its powers under Article 142 to direct the Punjab Authorities to transfer the accused/Respondent No. 3 (Mukhtar Ansari) to Uttar Pradesh.
  • The concerned Jail Superintendent of Uttar Pradesh was instructed to extend all medical facilities to the accused as per the Jail Manual.
To Read Full Judgement, Click Here
TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES LTD.  VS.  CYRUS INVESTMENT PVT. LTD.
CITATION : 2021 LASTEST CASELAW 170 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE:  26 – 03- 2021
JUDGE BENCH: S.A. BOBDE, CJI., A.S.BOPANNA , J. & V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN ,J.
ISSUE: Whether the order of the NCLT to reinstate Cyrus Mistery where in Lying with the provisions of Section 242 of the Company’s Act?
JUDGEMENT: In this case the Bench held that while the NCLT had dealt with every issue, the NCLAT did not deal with many of the issues and thus there was “no escape from the conclusion that NCLAT did not expressly overturn the findings of facts recorded by NCLT”. Thus,  the Supreme Court was not permitted to interfere with a finding of fact in an appeal under Section 423 of the Companies Act 2013, it could do so if the NCLAT’s finding was wholly perverse. Deciding all question of law in favour of the Tatas,
The Supreme Court, inter alia, held that:
  • The NCLAT’s was wrong in its view that the company’s affairs have been or are being conducted in a manner prejudicial and oppressive to some members and that the facts otherwise justify the winding up of the company on just and equitable ground. The Bench held that under a petition under Section 241 Companies Act 2013, the NCLAT could not ask whether the removal of a Director was legally valid and/or justified or not, but merely whether such removal amounted to conduct oppressive or prejudicial to some members. The Bench further held that there was never and there could never have been a relationship in the nature of a quasi partnership between the Tata Group and S.P. Group.
  • The Bench held that the NCLAT could not have directed the reinstatement of Cyrus Mistry into the Board of Tata Sons and other Tata companies as the same was not in accordance with the pleadings, reliefs sought and the NCLAT’s powers under Section 242(2) of the Companies Act 2013. This was because Sections 241 and 242 did not permit the Tribunal to make an order for reinstatement which is barred by Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 and the Principle of Legality.
  • Tata Sons (Private) Limited was a private company under Section 2(68) of the Companies Act 2013.”
To Read Full Judgement, Click Here
LAXMI PAT SURANA   VS.  UNION  BANK OF INDIA AND ANR.
CITATION: 2021 LATEST CASELAW 173 SC
JUDGEMENT DATE: 26 – 03 - 2021
JUDGE BENCH: A.M. KHANWILKAR, J., B.R. GAVAI, J. & KRISHNA MURARI, J.
ISSUE: Whether an action under section 7b  of the Insolvency and Bank ROPTCY Cody 2016 can be initiated by the financial creditor (Bank ) against a Corporate person being a (corporate debtor ) concerning guarantee offered by it in respect offer loan account of the principal borrower who had committed default and is not a “corporate person” within the meaning of the code.
JUDGEMENT: In this case the Supreme Court held that in accordance with the provisions of the IBC and Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, the status of the guarantor, who may be a corporate person, “metamorphoses” into the company debtor, the instant the principal borrower (regardless of not being a company person) commits default in payment of debt which had become “due and payable”. 
The Bench rejected the Appellant’s argument that “since the loan was offered to a proprietary firm (not a company person), action under Section 7 of the Code can not be initiated against the company person although it had offered guarantee in respect of that transaction”. Secondly, the Bench held that acknowledgment of the liability by the principal borrower within the limitation period, doesn't absolve the guarantor of its liability whether or not the latter had not acknowledged. The Bench found the liability within the amount of limitation as per Section 238A of the IBC, Section 18 read with Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963.

Relevant Links:

  • To Read Important Supreme Court Judgements of January 2021, Click Here
  • To Read Important Supreme Court Judgements of February 2021, Click Here

About the Author: This Case Brief is prepared by Ms. Sonakshi Verma, law graduate from Babu Banarasi Das University and is an Intern at MyLawman. She can be reached at sonakshiverma0403@gmail.com 


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